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MEDIATING DISPUTES ARISING OUT OF 
TROUBLED COMPANIES—DO IT SOONER 
RATHER THAN LATER 
THE HONORABLE RANDALL J. NEWSOME* 
My first employer after law school, U.S. District Judge Carl B. 
Rubin,1 was fond of saying that only crazy or desperate people take cases 
to trial—everyone else settles.  He may have been exaggerating a little, 
but what was true in the 1970’s is still true today: the overwhelming bulk 
of all lawsuits in all courts settle before trial.  That is no less true in 
bankruptcy court.  Particularly in large chapter 11 cases, compromise is 
king.  The shortest way to chapter 7 liquidation is to try to litigate your 
way into a chapter 11 plan.  Generally speaking, if you cannot cut a deal 
with your major creditors, you cannot get a chapter 11 plan confirmed, 
and the business cannot be reorganized. 
* The Honorable Randall J. Newsome (Ret.), a mediator with JAMS San Francisco, served 
as a federal bankruptcy judge in Ohio and California for twenty-eight years, including six years as 
chief bankruptcy judge for the Northern District of California.  He received his B.A., summa cum 
laude, from Boston University, and his J.D. from University of Cincinnati College of Law. 
© 2012 Bloomberg Finance L.P.  All rights reserved.  The original version of this article 
appeared in the June 13, 2011 issue of the Bloomberg Law Reports—Bankruptcy Law, Vol. 5 Issue 
24.  The views expressed herein are those of the author and not of Bloomberg Finance L.P.  These 
discussions are for informational purposes only. They do not take into account the qualifications, 
exceptions and other considerations that may be relevant to particular situations.  These discussions 
should not be construed as legal advice, which has to be addressed to particular facts and 
circumstances involved in any given situation.  Any tax information contained herein is not intended 
to be used, and cannot be used, for purposes of avoiding penalties imposed under the United States 
Internal Revenue Code.  Bloomberg Finance L.P. and its affiliated entities do not take responsibility 
for the content contained herein and do not make any representation or warranty as to its 
completeness or accuracy. 
 1 On April 29, 1971, Judge Carl B. Rubin was nominated by President Richard M. Nixon to 
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Over the last several years, there has been much academic debate on 
the subject of “vanishing trials”—whether the settlement rate in 
bankruptcy and other courts is accelerating, and whether that is a healthy 
trend for our justice system.2  A more interesting question is why 
disputes in chapter 11 cases are not resolved sooner.  Why does it take so 
much time and so much money for parties to settle their differences and 
arrive at a consensual chapter 11 plan? 
There certainly are ample financial incentives for settling early in 
the case.  The most obvious inducement is that a chapter 11 debtor is, by 
nature, a wasting resource.  The longer it remains in bankruptcy, the less 
value is available to pay creditors.  Although this has always been true, 
the fact is that the chapter 11 process has become far too expensive.  The 
problem is not merely the hourly rates and the number of hours billed, 
but the number of entities employed by the estate and how each of those 
entities staffs the case.  The fee allowance process was intended to be 
self-regulating under the Bankruptcy Code of 1978 through objections by 
parties in interest and decisions on those objections by the courts.3  That 
self-regulation simply has not materialized.  One of the stated missions 
of the United States trustees (the U.S. Justice Department officials 
charged with overseeing the administration of bankruptcy cases) is to 
monitor fee applications and object to them if appropriate.  But the 
United States trustee program does not have the resources to perform this 
task effectively, and other methods of addressing this problem, such as 
appointment of fee examiners and fee committees, have been equally 
ineffective. 
Although bankruptcy judges have an independent responsibility to 
review fee applications, the judges in New York and Delaware—the two 
principal venues for large chapter 11 filings—have little, if any, time to 
hear adversary proceedings and other contested matters, much less slog 
their way through mountains of time sheets.  Indeed, given the size of 
their case loads, it is a wonder they can function at all.  The bankruptcy 
court for the District of Delaware has six full-time judges and one part-
time visiting judge.  Between March 31, 2009 and March 31, 2010, 1355 
business chapter 11 cases were filed in that district.4  During that same 
 
 2 See Elizabeth Warren, Vanishing Trials: The Bankruptcy Experience, 1 J. EMPIRICAL 
EGAL 
OURTS—BUSINESS AND NONBUSINESS CASES 
OMME
ourts. scour stics/B
L STUD. 913, 929 (2004); Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and 
Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 498-99 (2004). 
 3 See 11 U.S.C.A. § 330 (Westlaw 2012). 
 4 U.S. COURTS, U.S. BANKRUPTCY C
C NCED, BY CHAPTER OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE, DURING THE 12-MONTH PERIOD ENDING 
MARCH 31, 2010 tbl.F-2 (Mar. 2010), available at 
www.usc gov/u ts/Stati ankruptcyStatistics/BankruptcyFilings/2010/0310_f2.pdf. 
2
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period, a staggering 3,349 adversary proceedings were filed, an increase 
of almost fifty percent over the previous year.5  The eleven judges of the 
bankruptcy court for the Southern District of New York, the venue for 
such cases as Lehman Brothers, General Motors and Chrysler, are 
equally overwhelmed.  Between March 31, 2009 and March 31, 2010, 
1513 business chapter 11 cases were filed in that district.6  During that 
same period, 2945 adversary proceed
percent over the previous year.7 
Assuming (but in no way conceding) that scorched-earth litigation 
is ever a cost-effective, productive strategy for obtaining a desired result, 
there is no room for such a strategy in these two districts.  The judges 
have neither the time nor the patience to provide the close judicial 
oversight that heated litigation battles require.  Moreover, the lack of 
judicial resources to hear the case when it is f
the hands of those benefiting from delay. 
Early resolution of disputes is essential if a claimant seeks to 
recover the greatest value in the shortest possible time.  Engaging a 
mediator at the front end of a dispute, rather than after hundreds of 
thousands or millions of dollars have been spent on discovery and 
motion practice, can further that goal.
involved demonstrate this point. 
In September of 1983, an involuntary chapter 11 petition was filed 
against Baldwin-United Corporation in the Southern District of Ohio.8  
With over 200 subsidiaries, $9 billion in assets and $10 billion in debt, it 
was the largest chapter 11 case ever filed at that time.  Many of the major 




 5 U.S. COURTS, U.S. BANKRUPTCY COURTS—ADVERSARY PROCEEDINGS COMMENCED, 
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ine Webber Grp., Inc. (In re Baldwin-United Corp. Litig.), 765 F.2d 343, 345 
. 
T ATED, AND PENDING UNDER THE BANKRUPTCY CODE, DURING THE 12-MONTH PERIODS 
ENDING MARCH 31, 2009 AND 2010 tbl.F-8 (Mar. 2010), available at 
www.uscourts.gov/Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics/2010/tabl
es/F08Mar10.pdf. 
 6 U.S. CO
C NCED, BY CHAPTER OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE, DURING THE 12-MONTH PERIOD ENDING 
MARCH 31, 2010 tbl.F-2 (Mar. 2010), available at 
www.usc gov/u ts/Stati ankruptcyStatistics/BankruptcyFilings/2010/0310_f2.pdf. 
 7 U.S. COURTS, U.S. BANKRUPTCY COURTS—ADVERSARY PROCEEDINGS COMMENCE
T ATED, AND PENDING UNDER THE BANKRUPTCY CODE, DURING THE 12-MONTH PERIODS 
ENDING MARCH 31, 2009 AND 2010 tbl.F-8 (Mar. 2010), available at 
www.uscourts.gov/Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics/2010/tabl
es/F08Mar10.pdf. 
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The principal difficulty was that the bulk of the companies’ assets 
were trapped in six insurance companies undergoing state rehabilitation 
proceedings in Arkansas and Indiana, while the bulk of the debt was held 
by the chapter 11 debtors.  In January of 1985, the debtors and 
rehabilitators reached an agreement on their respective claims.  But the 
path to a reorganization plan and the payment of creditors was blocked 
by three major disputes: a $450 million IRS claim; a $560 million 
secured claim held by a consortium of New York banks; and billions of 
dollars in indemnification claims held by stockbrokers who were being 
sued for securities fraud in federal court by Baldwin-United’s annuity 
holders.  These disputes had the potential to take five or more years to 
litigate.  The IRS audit process was estimated to last up to a decade.  The 
solution: each of these three major disputes was sent to mediation; they 
were all resolved by the end of 1985.  A plan was confirmed in March of 
1986, and the case was largely wrapped up by the end of 1986, just over 
three years after it was filed.  Recoveries by unsecured cre
igh as seventy cents on the dollar, seven times what the creditors 
would have been happy to receive at the outset of the case. 
A more recent example is Pacific Gas and Electric Co., which filed 
a chapter 11 petition in the Northern District of California on April 6, 
2001.9  Although the genesis of the filing was the California energy 
“crisis” of the previous year, the real fight was between the debtor’s 
parent, Pacific Gas and Electric Corp., and the California Public Utilities 
Commission (CPUC).  The issue was not money—both the debtor’s plan 
and CPUC’s competing plan would have paid all creditors in full.  
Rather, the parties were deadlocked on a number of non-monetary 
questions, the most divisive being the ext
nue to be the regulatory authority for the utility, as opposed to the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. 
The parties spent approximately seven months and millions of 
dollars preparing for and then trying a contested confirmation hearing 
involving competing plans.  After twenty-eight days of trial with 
seemingly no end in sight, the matter was submitted to judicially 
supervised mediation i
ed that allowed a plan of reorganization to be confirmed by the end 
of December of 2003. 
There is no question that this settlement cut months off of the plan 
confirmation process and years off of the inevitable appeals from a plan 
confirmation order, not to mention multiple millions of dollars in fees.  
 9 In re P. Gas & Elec. Co., 263 B.R. 306, 309 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2001). 
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mediation process been started in a serious way almost from the outset of 
the chapter 11 f
uld have. 
A smaller but perhaps more representative example is presented by 
Crescent Jewelers.  When it filed its chapter 11 petition in the Northern 
District of California in August of 2004, the company had approximately 
103 stores and $140 million in annual revenues.10  Harbinger Capital 
Partners Master Fund I bought Crescent’s parent company, Friedman’s, 
Inc., which had filed its own chapter 11 case. Crescent owed Friedman’s 
some $42 million.  Harbinger acquired $20 million of Crescent’s trade 
debt after Crescent’s chapter 11 case was filed.  In doing so, it controlled 
the majority of Crescent’s $96 million in total unsecured debt.  
Beginning in 2005, Crescent put itself up for sale.  When the only bidder 
turned out to be Harbinger, Crescent resisted.  Harbinger then pursued an 
aggressive litigation strategy, objecting to the debtor’s motion to extend 
its exclusive right to file a plan and filing a motion to appoint a trustee or 
examiner.  The relationship between the parties and the court quickly 
deteriorated to a point that the presiding judge took the extraordinary 
measure of revoking the telephonic appearance privileges of Harbinger’s
sel, and threatening to revoke their right to appear in the case at all. 
In an attempt to end the fighting, the judge directed the parties to 
mediation.  After a one-day session, an agreement was reached whereby 
Harbinger ended up owning Crescent in exchange for dropping its claims 
and making a substantial cash infusion into the company.  A plan 
implementing this agreement was confirmed less than two months later. 
Through the mediation process, the parties recognized their own self-
interests and avoided the additional fee
tracted fight would have brought. 
Early initiation of the mediation process can be particularly 
effective in dealing with multi-party disputes such as Ponzi schemes.  In 
Ponzi scheme bankruptcy cases, the trustee typically will bring dozens, if 
not hundreds, of preference and fraudulent transfer suits. Particularly as 
to preferences, it is difficult if not impossible to explain to defendants 
(even in non-Ponzi cases) why they are being sued for receiving money 
 10 Crescent Jewelers Files for Bankruptcy, S.F. BUS. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2004, 8:21 AM), 
available at www.bizjournals.com/sanfrancisco/stories/2004/08/09/daily36.html?page=all. 
 11 See 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 547 (providing for the avoidance of preferential transfers), 548 
(providing for the avoidance of fraudulent transfers) (Westlaw 2012).  Grossly oversimplified, if an 
insolvent debtor paid or transferred property to a creditor shortly before a bankruptcy case was filed, 
section 547 allows the debtor in possession or trustee to “avoid” the transfer in order to foster 
equitable treatment of similarly situated creditors.  Section 548, again quite simplified, allows the 
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Preference defendants, who may have received only a small portion of 
their initial investment back, often feel outraged that they are now being 
sued to surrender what little they have recovered, particularly if it is 
unlikely they will recover more than a fraction of what they are owed.  
Moreover, the people who invest in Ponzi schemes are often 
unsophisticated and sometimes just plain odd, which may increase the 
level of emotional reaction when they are sued.  They also may be broke. 
There is no one correct way for the court to handle a mass of 
lawsuits with angry defendants.  One useful approach, however, is to set 
them down for status or scheduling conferences spaced in one-hour 
increments with fifty cases (or as many people as the courtroom will 
hold) every hour.  At the status conference(s), the court should begin by 
explaining the basics of preferences and fraudulent transfers, which 
many of the defendants (often representing themselves) may not 
understand.  The court might then propose the following procedure: (i) 
the trustee or plaintiff is directed to tender an initial disclosure of 
evidence he intends to rely upon in his case-in-chief within ten days (if 
he has not done so already); (ii) the trustee (plaintiff) is directed to make 
an offer of settlement to each defendant within twenty to thirty days after 
making his initial disclosure; (iii) within ten days thereafter, each 
defendant will respond with a good faith counteroffer; (iv) within another 
twenty days, the trustee (plaintiff) will send a letter to the court 
indicating that the parties have done as the court directed (without saying 
what the offers and counteroffers are).  The defendants will not be 
required to make an initial disclosure or file an answer until the 
foregoing preliminary settlement process is completed. 
If the parties have settled, the trustee shall take whatever action is 
necessary to formalize the settlement.  If the parties have not settled, the 
court will direct the defendant to file an answer or other responsive 
pleading to the complaint, tender initial disclosures, and appear at a 
continued status conference to set discovery cut-off dates and address 
other pretrial matters.  Many of these lawsuits will settle in the 
preliminary settlement phase.  Those that do not can be sent to mediation 
after discovery is completed.  The odds are excellent that none of them 
will ever be tried. 
If the court is unable or unwilling to be involved in this pretrial 
process, then a mediator can be appointed to handle the preliminary 
settlement phase and, ultimately, to mediate any cases that have not 
 
debtor in possession or trustee to avoid a pre-bankruptcy transfer that the debtor made either for less 
than reasonably equivalent value while the debtor was financially impaired, or with actual intent to 
hinder delay or defraud creditors. 
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ptcy, it is important that the court direct the parties to 
attempt to settle their differences before large sums of money are spent 
preparing for trial. 
settled as of the close of discovery.  Submitting a dispute to mediation 
will not work miracles.  It will not bring about instant peace or an 
immediate resolution of all problems surrounding a troubled company.  
But a mediator can focus the parties’ attention on reconciling their 
differences rather than pursuing litigation, thus potentially taking years 
off of the reorganization process and saving everyone a great deal of 
money.  It is important to involve the mediator early on, and it is most 
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